Recently, China's enlightened media Caixin published two special news reports. One was that another bureau-level cadre of the China Securities Regulatory Commission was taken away for investigation, and the other was that the president of Zheshang Securities, who had been under investigation for more than a year, was handed over to justice. Coincidentally, I had some interactions with both of them, bringing back my memories of similar incidents/cases around me.
In China's political environment, disciplinary investigations with no time constraints and legal procedures have become prominent. Following the anti-corruption efforts of the past decade, this approach, resembling unlawful detention, has grown more severe and less transparent. However, for those in charge, it serves as a powerful tool. The focus of these investigations has shifted from party officials and high-ranking leaders to regular party members, and even to any businessperson deemed to be under "reasonable" suspicion. With adequate resources and incentives, broadening the scope to encompass the entire populace may be conceivable.
This method serves as a governance tool and is deemed necessary and rational. I prefer not to elaborate further. I am surrounded by numerous former leaders and friends who have faced questioning or investigation or collaborated with investigations. Some have seen their political careers end or have even been incarcerated.
In 2014, I first realized the importance of this method when Zhou Yongkang was under investigation and his secretary was missing. The secretary's old classmate, who was among their friends, also faced a period of tension despite minimal communication since graduation. The previously sparse exchanges now seemed sensitive due to uncertainty about the potential extension of the investigation.
The second time was after National Day in 2015, when Su Shulin was investigated, and his previous secret was also revealed. I had some common classmates with him, and we had a small get-together before he went to Fujian. We had no interest in each other, but we knew that he was a smart and capable person of the same age.
This was followed by the case of veteran leader Xiang Junbo in 2017, the case of Lai Xiaomin in 2018, and the case of veteran leader Liu Shiyu in 2019. From 2015 to 2016, I had a working relationship with President Xiang, who was then the deputy governor of the People's Bank of China and director of the Shanghai headquarters. Of course, he was a senior cadre and my immediate boss, so we had no direct relationship. In comparison, business interactions with Mr. Liu are more frequent. I have no connection with Chairman Lai, but his early secretary was my classmate, so he was investigated and implicated for many years.
During 2019, the Shanghai Fengxian Discipline Inspection Commission investigated and sentenced former colleagues, superiors, and friends who had resigned. Subsequently, additional former colleagues and leaders were successively dismissed, such as the initial officer and the third deputy from when I first joined the unit. The ongoing dismissals have become increasingly disheartening. The individuals mentioned initially have no professional connection; their relationship is purely personal with a hint of friendship.
The group of cadres dealt with by the Financial Port may have violations of disciplines or laws or flaws themselves, but their ability to reach such a position within the system indicates that they have taken risks in the reform and are responsible and courageous. Eliminating them at once does not seem to have a positive impact on social development. Firstly, their absence will create a technology and management gap; secondly, with the new rules applied retroactively, only average individuals will remain; thirdly, the demonstration effect will be lost, leading to a lack of initiative, innovation, and change.
Consequently, there have been changes in ecology and culture. If a sudden shift leads to a revival of reform and openness, immediate resources may not be available, potentially resulting in chaos and haphazard implementation. Overly rigid planning and centralization could lead to a loss of vitality within the social structure, making the organization cumbersome and ineffective.
The duration required to recover depends on the speed at which talent deficiencies can be addressed. This will undoubtedly result in a lost generation.
日前，中国开明媒体财新网发了两条专题新闻，一条是又一位中国证监会的局级干部被带走调查，另一条是此前接受调查一年有余的浙商证券总裁移交司法。恰巧，与这两位都有些许交集，也勾起了我对于身边其他类似事件/案件的回忆。
没有时限和法定程序的纪律调查是中国当然政治生态的特色。自十年前大力反腐以来，这种类似于非法拘役的手段逐渐强化，也变得越来越不透明。但对于治理者来说，这无疑是一把很锋利的刀。调查对象从党员领导干部扩展到一般党员，再到任何受到“合理”怀疑的企业主。如果资源和回报足够，我相信范围进一步扩大到覆盖全体社会人员也不是不可能。
作为治理工具，这种手段有其存在的必要性、合理性。我无意过多评论。身边有很多前领导、朋友都接受过问话、调查或配合调查，也有些就此结束了政治生涯，甚至沦为阶下囚。
最早一次感知这种手段就在不远处，是在2014年，周永康接受调查后不久，他的秘书也随即失联。友人中有这位秘书的老同学，他们毕业后就很少交集，但一时间风声鹤唳，过往稀疏的通讯内容也变得敏感。因为无从得知调查对象是否会向下延展。
第二次是2015年国庆之后，苏树林接受调查，同时被带走的还有他此前的大秘。我与这位有些共同同学，也曾在他去福建之前小聚，没有任何利益往来，但了解是个聪明、能干的同龄人。
紧接着是2017年老领导项俊波案、2018年赖小民案、2019年老领导刘士余案。2015-2016年，我与时任人行副行长、上海总部主任的项行长有工作上的交集，当然，他是高级干部，是我直属领导的顶头上司，并没有直接关系。相比而言，与刘行长的业务交集更加频密。倒是与赖董事长没有任何联系，但他早年的秘书却是我同学，因此受了多年的调查和牵连。
2019年，曾经的老同事、前辈、好友在离职后，被上海奉贤纪委带走调查，继而被判刑。再之后，更多的老同事、老领导相继落马，其中包括我刚工作时单位里的一正三副。听得多了，也就渐渐麻木。至于最开始提到的两位，没有工作往来，纯属私人关系有些情谊。
我想说的是，金融口处理的一批干部，不是说他们本人没有违纪违法或者瑕疵，而是他们作为体系的一颗螺丝钉，能够走到这样的位置，至少是在改革中承担过风险，有担当有胆识的。瑕不掩瑜也好，功不抵过也罢，一杆子打死的结果，目前看来，对社会发展是没有起到积极作用的。一来，这些专业干部的消失，必然带来技术和管理的断层；二来，以新规则溯及以往，剩下的只能是些庸碌之辈；三来，示范作用是不主动担当，不求新求变。
由此，生态变了、文化变了。即便突然转向，重提改革开放，短期内也无人可用，只可能发生混乱和盲目执行。过度的计划和集权，会让社会有机体失去活力，也会让组织机构变得臃肿低效。
需要多久才能回到正轨，取决于人才的断层修复的速度。这必将牺牲整整一代人。
#Chinese politics #Anti-corruption #reform and opening up #political commentary
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