After 2019, Hong Kong fell into darkness. In terms of politics, economy, market dynamics, and demographics, what was once a robust "pentagon warrior" now withers helplessly.
Describing it as being entangled in both internal and external troubles is not an overstatement. Internally, there is a profound lack of trust among the populace towards the government, or rather, mutual distrust. It's akin to severe disagreements between shareholders and management in a company, where management believes the shareholders have become too meddlesome (acting too much like they own the company), while shareholders think management is siding with external forces. Consequently, shareholders wish to oust the management, and the management, in turn, allies with external investors to initiate an MBO (Management Buy-Out). Common sense indicates that such internal chaos leads to low productivity and decreased profitability as significant resources are consumed by internal strife. During downturns, companies often engage in internal rectification, like enforcing attendance rules or ideological education, further redirecting resources to less efficient departments, creating little business or social value. The more the management struggles in its incompetence, the worse it gets. As shareholders face this deadlock, their response is to consume a "poison pill" — they refuse cooperation, effectively increasing acquisition costs and pursuing nonviolent resistance.
This strategy of stagnation inadvertently cedes more power to the management, which, emboldened in its pursuit of a "proactive government," strays further from the ideals of freedom and market economy, thus ensnaring itself in a vicious cycle.
Externally, there's the looming pressure of northern ambitions and the disdain of neighboring regions. When Hong Kong was an abandoned outpost, neighbors were more relaxed, with mutual exchanges benefiting all, characterizing it as a middle ground or intermediary. But now that Hong Kong has found a powerful patron flexing its muscles and encroaching upon shared resources, it loses favor among those neighbors, who expect its decline, much like a small affluent equatorial nation might.
International politics operates purely on interests, not positions. States offer support when it benefits them; otherwise, they counteract. That's the crux of it.
As an orphan, Hong Kong thrived — neglected but free. It became a place where anyone could negotiate and profit from informational asymmetries. Power, resources, intelligence, and more could be monetized. Yet, with newfound control by a paternal figure — imposing restrictions and enforcement — the waters that once harbored rich life become desolate.
Given its reduced role, the U.S. naturally treats Hong Kong as a card to play, employing it to negotiate broader geopolitical goals. If negotiations stall, what begins as mere bluffs could become real actions, harmful even if not beneficial to the player.
Should Hong Kong lose its special trading status, the peg between the Hong Kong Dollar and other currencies would be significantly challenged. As internal and external pressures mount, Hong Kong’s political ecosystem fractures and barely sustains itself, with the economy plummeting despite increased mainland migration under new talent schemes. But the fundamental issue of attracting foreign capital remains unsolved.
Foreign capital flows either through industrial investment, export revenues, high-end immigration, or speculative funds. The first three represent sustainable inflows — essential and enduring — whereas the fourth, speculative interest, is fleeting. Thus, examining the sources and volume of these capital flows reveals the future trajectory of this economy. Viewing Hong Kong as a company that must develop, innovate, and provide employee welfare necessitates strategic investments, high-margin products, and attracting top talent. Presently, overseas strategic investments are retreating while mainland ones enter, exports face decline, and high-caliber talent now comprises mainly those struggling on local earnings, as the middle-class locals emigrate.
As the externally driven economy transitions to an endogenous one, the logical progression suggests the inevitable integration of the Hong Kong Dollar with the Renminbi. The Hong Kong Dollar — akin to a token at a casino — holds no intrinsic value; its worth stems from the government's assurance of convertibility into any globally recognized currency. This assurance once attracted substantial speculative funds, though less so now. Presently, the primary spending of Hong Kong Dollar holders occurs northward, negating retail demand linked to international currencies. In this context, cross-border payment systems and the eHKD emerge, where the eHKD no longer requires a dollar anchor as its use skews local and northern.
At the wholesale level, Hong Kong, buoyed by central support, is vigorously advancing the central bank's currency bridge project, leveraging cross-sovereign equivalents for ultimate clearing and settlement. Upon implementation, the need for dollar linkage dissipates.
Once all mechanisms are ready, the linked exchange rate system naturally dissolves, though the transition will not be swift, optimistically taking 1-2 years. Factors accelerating this include a dramatic export contraction, capital flight, significant depletion of foreign exchange reserves, expanding fiscal deficits, a surge in offshore Renminbi deployment in Hong Kong, the official launch of eHKD, and the currency bridge project’s commencement.
All these considerations presume external conditions remain stable. War would change everything. The future is now, poised for transformation, where quantitative buildup triggers qualitative change in an instant.
For reference, I posed the same questions to ChatGPT, and its response, while somewhat general, was directionally aligned.
2019年之后，香港陷入黑暗。政治、经济、市场、基础人口等等，从前的五边形战士，能力萎缩成渣。
用内忧外患来形容一点不为过。内忧是民众对政府的不信任，或者是互不信任。仿如一个公司的股东与管理层发生了严重分歧，管理层觉得股东太把自己当回事儿了（真拿自己当公司的主人了），股东觉得管理层完全胳膊肘向外拐。于是，股东想废掉管理层，管理层联系外部投资人想MBO。有点常识都知道，公司搞成这样，是绝对没什么好的效益的。大量的资源必定被内耗掉，效率低下、盈利能力下降。业绩不好的时候，公司往往都会干一件事，整顿内务，比如抓考勤、抓思想教育、整人之类的。于是资源继续流向效率更加低的部门，无法创造企业价值，更不用说社会价值。管理层无能，越是努力，就越是糟糕。股东一看落入僵局，那就吞毒丸吧。摆烂、增加收购方的治理成本，非暴力不合作。
可正是由于摆烂，让渡出了更多的权力予管理层，加上管理层刻意进取，“有为政府”，反而更偏离了自由与市场。于是，这就陷入了死循环。
外患，除了北方虎视眈眈的爹，还有周边邻居翻起的白眼。当H还是个弃子遗孤时候，邻里难免都会少一些戒备心。加上它受恩图报，互有往来，大家也乐得有个中间人、中间地界。如果这个孤儿找到了爸爸，爸爸还是个很强壮的大汉，最近又开始炫耀肌肉，把邻居家的鱼塘划进自家的自留地。邻居们是不会给这个孩子好脸色的。客气点的，就是盼着他一天不如一天，比如那个赤道上的发达小国。
国际政治是只讲利益不讲立场的。有利于各国的状态，各国就支持，反之，就打击。如此而已。
孤儿状态的香港很好，爹不管妈不疼，但是自由啊。谁都可以来勾兑，谁都可以挣一些信息差的钱。权力、资源、情报、肉体……都可以在这里变现。突然有一天爹爹要管了，这也不许那也不准，还要抓人，这下水至清则无鱼了。
既然H发挥不了它的作用了，美国自然也就把他当个牌来打。打狗看主人，意思是围魏救赵谈谈条件。如果不谈，那就虚招变实招，虽不利己，但可损人。
那么如果，香港特殊经贸关系地位被取消，联系汇率制度和港币，是一定会受到冲击的。内忧外患之下，香港的政治生态已经支离破碎、勉强支撑，经济更是一落千丈。虽然有大量的内地血液通过新的人才输入计划南下，但从根本上没有解决香港获得外国资金的根本问题。
外资流入，一是产业投资，二是出口创汇，三是高端移民，四是热钱逐利。前三个是中长期资金，是源头活水，后一个是流量做不得数。那我们就只需要看，香港的水源在不在，量大不大，就知道这个经济体未来会往哪里走。还是把它看作一家公司，要发展要创造要员工福利，无非也是引入战略投资、销售高利润率的产品以及吸引高端人才维持创新能力。现在的情况是，海外战略投资在撤出，内地的在进入，出口转口都百兴待废，高才优才招了一批只有人民币且谋生都困难的低保户，本地中产反而是在向外流出。
在外向型经济变成内生型经济之后，我们用通常逻辑来推演，港币的人民币化就是必然的。港币本身就是一个Token，一个赌场的筹码，它没有价值，所有价值都来自于政府信用担保可以把筹码换成任意国际通行货币，光这一项曾经的“洗钱”项目，就能吸引来很多热钱。当然现在也没那么猖獗了。到了今天，港币持有人更多的消费场景是北上，那么在零售端的需求就不存在了，也没人在意它能不能换回美元，只要它能换成或者直接在北边消费就可以。这就是跨境支付通和eHKD的作用。eHKD的零售场景不再需要以美元为锚，因为它多用于本地和内地。
在批发端，香港也在中央的支持下，大力推动央行货币桥项目。通过几家央行间的超主权等价物来实现最终清结算。一旦实施，也会绕开美元体系，或者不再需要与美元挂钩。
当这一切都准备好了之后，联系汇率制度自然瓦解。但这个过程不会太快，最悲观的估计要1-2年来落地。在这过程中，是否会加速就取决于几个指标：1. 出口急剧萎缩；2. 海外资金流出；3. 外汇存底大幅下降；4. 政府财政赤字扩大；5. 离岸人民币在港投放规模突增；6. eHKD正式上线；7. 货币桥项目启动。
当然，这还是在外部环境比较稳定的前提下，如果是战争状态又另当别论。未来已来，厚积薄发。量变到质变只是一瞬间。
参考资料，同样的问题我问了ChatGPT，下面是它给的回答。虽然略显空泛，但大方向是一致的。
如果香港的特殊经贸地位被取消，香港的联系汇率制度和港币可能会面临一系列影响：
汇率压力增加：联系汇率制度将港币与美元固定挂钩。在取消特殊经贸地位后，市场对香港经济的信心可能会受到打击，导致资本外流和投资减少。这种不确定性可能会对港币造成下行压力，增强市场对汇率波动的担忧。
投资和贸易受到影响：特殊经贸地位的取消可能导致香港与主要贸易伙伴之间的贸易关系下降，降低港口的贸易量。随着经济活动放缓，港币的需求可能会减少，进而影响其汇率稳定。
货币政策的挑战：香港金融管理局在维护联系汇率制度的过程中，通常需要使用外汇储备进行干预。如果汇率受到极大压力，可能导致外汇储备迅速减少，增加货币政策的复杂性。金融管理局需要在维持汇率稳定和支持经济增长之间找到平衡。
经济身份的模糊：香港的特殊经贸地位使其在国际市场上具备独特的经济身份，取消该地位将可能影响香港作为自主经济体的认知。这种身份的模糊可能会影响外资的流入，并对香港的商业环境带来长期影响。
综上所述，如果香港的特殊经贸地位被取消，联系汇率制度和港币将面临不小的挑战。政策制定者需谨慎应对，以维护经济稳定和港币的国际信誉。
The linked exchange rate system, established in 1983, anchors the Hong Kong dollar (HKD) to the US dollar (USD) at a fixed rate, providing stability and confidence in the territory's financial framework. This system has enabled Hong Kong to become a global financial hub, attracting international investments and facilitating trade. However, if the special privileges that Hong Kong enjoys in economic and trade relations were to be revoked, several ramifications could impact the linked exchange rate system.
First, the revocation of special economic privileges would likely lead to increased uncertainty among investors and traders regarding Hong Kong's market dynamics. Shifts in investor confidence could result in capital outflows, placing downward pressure on the HKD. The linked exchange rate system, designed to maintain a stable currency, may face heightened stress as the government intervenes to defend the peg, potentially depleting foreign reserves.
Second, a loss of preferential trade status could disrupt trade flows between Hong Kong and its key partners, leading to a decline in economic activity. Such a slowdown could result in reduced demand for the HKD as businesses scale down operations or seek alternatives in other currencies, which would complicate the management of the pegged exchange rate.
Furthermore, the linked exchange rate system relies heavily on Hong Kong’s credibility as a free-market economy. The revocation of its special privileges might raise questions about its autonomy and operational independence, threatening the perception of Hong Kong as a separate economic entity from mainland China. If the linked exchange rate system is seen as incompatible with the broader political landscape, it may necessitate a reevaluation of monetary policy and potentially lead to a shift towards more flexible exchange rate mechanisms.
In conclusion, the revocation of Hong Kong's special economic and trade privileges could strain its linked exchange rate system, as it would introduce significant uncertainty in investor sentiment, disrupt trade relations, and challenge the territory’s economic identity. Policymakers would need to navigate these challenges carefully to maintain stability and confidence in the financial system.
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